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I. INTRODUCTION
 Institutional litigation involving class actions against the city of New York 
essentially began in the 1970s and has grown to be a significant part of the workload 
in the General Litigation Division of the New York City Law Department.  However, 
the methods currently being used to resolve these cases are not efficient.  The city 
typically enters into detailed consent decrees.  Consent decrees are agreements where 
the parties in a dispute acquiesce to injunctive relief.1  These agreements provide for 
an extended period of time for the city to comply with the terms of the decree. 
Complying with these consent decrees is very costly and time consuming for the city 
and often results in continuing litigation.
 This article will focus on litigation concerning the city’s detention facilities and 
the homeless because they present the best case studies for discussing how the Law 
Department handles institutional litigation.  I will then suggest alternative methods 
to resolve institutional litigation that will be more cost effective and reduce the strain 
on the city’s valuable resources.
II. DETENTION FACILITIES CASES
 In 1970, an action was commenced against the city on behalf of un-convicted 
detainees housed in the Manhattan House of Detention, popularly known as “the 
Tombs.”2  In 1974, the district court found a number of institutional violations, and, 
as a result, ordered the city to submit a plan for remedying the conditions at the 
Tombs.3  By July 1974 the city had not even provided a timetable as to when the 
required work would commence.4  As a result of the city’s delays in submitting the 
comprehensive plan, the court ordered the Tombs closed within 30 days.5  The city 
appealed and the Second Circuit remanded for the district court to reconsider its 
closing order.6
 After the remand, the city closed the Tombs and transferred all of the detainees 
to the House of Detention for Men, a facility on Rikers Island.7  The city then 
argued that the transferred detainees were in a new facility and would not be entitled 
to the improvement of the conditions ordered by the judge in the Tombs case.8  The 
city asked for discovery and a trial.  The court rejected this request, which was 
affirmed by the Second Circuit.9
1. See Harold Baer, Jr. & Arminda Bepko, A Necessary and Proper Role for Federal Courts in Prison Reform: 
The Benjamin v. Malcolm Consent Decrees, 52 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 3 (2007).
2. Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
3. Id.
4. Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
5. Id. at 996.
6. Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974).
7. Rhem v. Malcolm, 389 F. Supp. 964, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
8. Id. at 966–67.
9. Rhem v. Malcolm, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975).
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 In 1975, an action was brought challenging the conditions at the House of 
Detention for Men.10  A trial was held in 1976, and post-trial memorandums were 
submitted in 1977.  During this period, there were also challenges to the conditions 
at other detention facilities on Rikers Island and facilities in the Bronx, Brooklyn, 
and Queens.11
 Ed Koch became New York City’s mayor on January 1, 1978.  Mayor Koch 
directed Allen Schwartz, the new Corporation Counsel, to attempt to settle all of 
the detention cases.12  The first settlement agreement was entered in November 
1978.13  It was an extremely detailed, fifty-page document, covering every aspect of 
the operation of the Rikers Island detention facility.14  The agreement covered thirty-
one subjects, including punitive segregation, dayroom access, environmental health, 
laundry, cell searches, and recreation.15  The Deputy Mayor’s Office for Criminal 
Justice was directly involved in the negotiations and the decree was signed by the 
Corporation Counsel.
 Similar consent decrees were entered for all of the facilities involved in litigation.16 
The consent decrees contemplated an extended time period for compliance.17  They 
resulted in an enormous increase in capital and expense funds for the Department of 
Correction.18  Despite these expenditures, the litigation continued.
 Since 1980, every Corporation Counsel has dealt with the provisions of the 
consent decrees.  Some of the cases included: a complaint alleging overcrowding at 
the House of Detention for Men;19 a motion to join the state of New York as defendant 
to enable the city to comply with consent decrees;20 an application for an order to 
modify previous orders imposing a population cap on the House of Detention for 
Men;21 a motion to punish the city Department of Correction for contempt;22 another 
motion to modify an order;23 a motion to terminate a consent decree under the Prison 
10. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
11. See, e.g., Forts v. Malcolm, 426 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Ambrose v. Malcolm, 414 F. Supp. 485 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Detainees v. Malcolm, 421 F. Supp. 832 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). 
12. See Baer & Bepko, supra note 1, at 23.
13. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 803 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1986).
14. See Ted S. Storey, When Intervention Works: Judge Morris E. Lasker and New York City Jails, in Courts, 
Corrections, and the Constitution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and 
Jails 138, 154 (John J. Dilulio, Jr. ed., 1990).
15. Id.
16. See Benjamin, 803 F.2d at 48.
17. But see Storey, supra note 14, at 156.
18. Id. at 156–57.
19. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
20. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 88 F.R.D. 333, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
21. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 646 F. Supp. 1550, 1551 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
22. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 752 F. Supp. 140, 141–42 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
23. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 884 F. Supp. 122, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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Litigation Reform Act;24 and a motion to terminate an order regarding extreme 
temperature conditions in the facilities.25
 The prison consent decrees, however, did not contain provisions that would limit 
the duration of the consent decree, known as sunset provisions.  However, in view of 
the fact that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (which encourages the 
termination of prisoners lawsuits) did not result in the conclusion of the New York 
City detention cases, it is doubtful whether a sunset provision would have been 
implemented by the court to end the litigation.
III. HOMELESS FACILITIES CASES
 The homeless litigation is instructive because it involves cases that ended in 
consent decrees and matters that have been fully litigated.
 In Callahan v. Carey, a case that took place in 1979, the plaintiffs were homeless 
men living in New York City.  They brought an action against the city and state of 
New York alleging that the city had failed to provide adequate shelter facilities in 
violation of their statutory and constitutional rights.26  In 1981, the city and state 
entered into a detailed consent decree that constituted the final judgment in the 
case.27  The consent decree set forth shelter standards including the width of beds, 
clean sheets, capacity limits, recreation, and use of telephones.28  The consent decree 
did not contain a sunset provision.29 
 In Eldridge v. Koch, the appellate division applied the men’s consent decree to 
women’s shelters as required under the federal and state constitutions.30
 In McCain v. Koch, homeless individuals with children commenced an action 
seeking to require the city to place families who required assistance in emergency 
housing facilities that satisfied health, safety, and other residential regulation 
standards.31  In 1986, the appellate division held that the homeless plaintiffs’ families 
were entitled to emergency shelter.32  The finding was based on statutory rights and 
on the federal and state constitutions.33 
24. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
25. Benjamin v. Horn, No. 75 Civ. 3073 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
26. Callahan v. Carey, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11, 1979 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Dec. 5, 1979).
27. The Callahan Consent Decree, Callahan v. Carey, No. 79/42582 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Dec. 5, 1979), 
available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/callahanconsentdecree.pdf.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 469 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (1st Dep’t 1983).
31. 484 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986–87 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984).
32. McCain v. Koch, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720, 727–28 (1st Dep’t 1986).
33. Id. at 728–30.
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 Since the decision, every Corporation Counsel has been actively involved in the 
McCain case.  The matter went to the appellate division four times34 and the New 
York Court of Appeals twice before a final judgment was rendered.35  On September 
17, 2008, Judge Jacqueline Silberman of the Supreme Court, New York County, 
issued a final judgment regarding the McCain litigation, which included the following 
party stipulations: (1) that all motions and claims for relief be dismissed with 
prejudice; (2) that all orders be vacated; and (3) that all aspects of the McCain 
litigation be closed and that no further proceedings or motions be brought.
 Both the consent order in Callahan and the litigated orders in McCain have 
resulted in a substantial increase in the funding for homeless services.36  Some of the 
litigated orders in McCain are as detailed as the consent order in Callahan.37  After a 
period of time, when the issue of capacity generated substantial litigation, Callahan 
became relatively quiet.  McCain, however, had, up until its resolution, been much 
more contentious, involving many appearances before the court, two different 
mediators, and over fifty court orders.38
IV. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION CASES
 Two other major cases commenced in the 1970s ended in detailed consent decrees 
without sunset provisions.  Jose P. challenged the appropriateness of instruction and 
related educational services for students with disabilities.39  This case ended with a 
consent decree in 1979.40  The city now spends approximately two billion dollars on 
special education services, yet there are still disputes about whether the city is meeting 
its obligations under the decree.
 Wilder v. Bernstein challenged the procedures for the placement of children in 
foster care.41  The consent decree was a very detailed forty-six pages.42
34. McCain v. Giuliani, 676 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep’t 1998); McCain v. Giuliani, 653 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1st 
Dep’t 1997); McCain v. Dinkins, 301 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1st Dep’t 1993); McCain v. Koch, 523 N.Y.S.2d 
112 (1st Dep’t 1988).
35. McCain v. Giuliani, 93 N.Y.2d 848 (1999); McCain v. Dinkins, 84 N.Y.2d 216 (1994). 
36. Cf. Jonathan L. Hafetz, Homeless Legal Advocacy: New Challenges and Directions for the Future, 30 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 1215, 1231–32 (2003) (noting that the Callahan consent decree required New York 
City to provide substantial new services for homeless men and “set forth basic standards for the shelters,” 
which would naturally have to result in increased funding for such services).
37. See, e.g., McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 115 (1987) (describing the standards set forth in the McCain 
v. Koch injunction of June 27, 1984); McCain v. Koch, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720, 725–27 (1st Dep’t 1986) 
(describing several of the orders resulting from the litigation).
38. See McCain, 93 N.Y.2d 848; McCain, 84 N.Y.2d 216; McCain, 676 N.Y.S.2d 151; McCain, 653 N.Y.S.2d 
556; McCain, 301 N.Y.S.2d 271; McCain, 523 N.Y.S.2d 112.
39. Jose P. v. Ambach, 699 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1982).
40. Id. at 870.
41. 499 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
42. See Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292, 1298–1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff ’d, 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 
1988).
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 The Wilder consent decree became inextricably linked to another litigation: 
Marisol A. v. Giuliani, commenced in 1995.43  Marisol challenged the entire foster 
case system and the Administration for Children’s Services’ (“ACS”) treatment of 
children in their custody who would be at risk of neglect or abuse if not in ACS’s 
custody.44  An advisory panel was established to review the reform plan prepared by 
the city.45  The parties agreed to dismiss the Marisol case and also terminate the 
Wilder proceeding in a court approved consent agreement.46  However, the advisory 
panel would retain jurisdiction to study the ACS’s operation and make 
recommendations.47
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
 Institutional reform litigation, if successful, necessarily impacts the city’s ability 
to manage a particular institution.  To avoid this problem, courts should be receptive 
to ending a case when the litigation has achieved realistic goals.  If the courts reward 
the city for committing substantial funds and resources to solving institutional 
problems by allowing the city to terminate the litigation, the city will be more likely 
to try to settle cases, which could be in the best interests of all parties.
 There are several alternatives to the methods the city typically employs to resolve 
institutional reform cases, all of which will aid the city in achieving the necessary 
reforms, while preventing a long and costly litigation process.  Sunset provisions in 
consent decrees, private settlement agreements, and pre-litigation demand letters are 
such alternatives.
 A. Sunset Provisions
 Since Marisol, the city has routinely inserted a sunset provision in consent decrees. 
For example, in Sheppard v. Phoenix, the plaintiffs challenged the treatment of 
prisoners in the Central Punitive Segregation Unit, a correctional facility on Rikers 
Island.48  The detailed agreement provided that the decree would terminate upon 
defendant’s motion, within two years of the date of the stipulation, unless the court 
makes new, written findings that additional relief is necessary.49  In 2002, the district 
court terminated the litigation, noting that the city had followed the recommendations 
of the experts.50 
43. Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 185 F.R.D. 152, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 157–58.
46. Id. at 158.
47. Id.
48. 210 F. Supp. 450, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (providing background about the complaint brought by the 
plaintiffs).
49. Michael A. Cardozo, The Use of ADR Involving Local Governments: The Perspective of the New York City 
Corporation Counsel, 34 Fordham Urb. L.J. 797, 807 (2007).
50. Sheppard, 210 F. Supp. at 451–52; see also Cardozo, supra note 49, at 807.
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 The Sheppard case is in sharp contrast from the detention facilities cases discussed 
above.  In those cases, litigation with respect to the consent decrees persisted for over 
twenty years.  In Sheppard, the case concluded in a mere four years.  The fact that 
there was a sunset provision attached to the consent decree in the Sheppard case may 
be very well responsible for the distinction.
 However, it is possible that the history of the detention facilities cases might not 
have been different if there were sunset provisions in the consent decrees.  In light of 
the history in the case, it is unclear whether the plaintiffs’ attorney would have 
accepted a sunset provision.  Moreover, if there were a sunset provision, it is not 
likely that it would have been implemented because the city was not in compliance 
with a significant part of the decree.  Furthermore, in the event the city decided to 
litigate the detention facilities cases to conclusion, it is likely that the trial judge 
would have entered a very detailed judgment involving the same areas touched upon 
in the consent decree.
 Regardless of what the result would have been in the detention facilities cases, 
the presence of the sunset provision encourages the parties to intensively focus on the 
substantive provisions during the sunset period.  A time-limited decree encourages 
the city to comply with the court-ordered obligations as quickly as possible so as to 
end the litigation by the sunset date.
 B. Private Settlement Agreements
 In addition to sunset provisions in consent decrees as a mechanism for swift 
resolution to institutional litigation reform, the city has entered into private settlement 
agreements to resolve cases.  Ingles v. Toro involved allegations of excessive force 
against inmates in the facilities operated by the Department of Correction.51  The 
parties entered into a written agreement that terminated the case.  The agreement 
also provided that if the plaintiff was unhappy with the performance of the agreement, 
he could either return to court and seek reinstatement of the litigation, or seek 
specific performance in state court.52
 C. Pre-litigation Demand Letters
 The city of New York should also continue to encourage pre-litigation demand 
letters—letters that identify the issues which are to be the subject of the institutional 
litigation.  There have been a number of cases where the city has avoided litigation 
through corrective action as a result of these letters.  A good example is when the 
city revoked Section 8 housing subsidies for a number of families.  In response to a 
pre-litigation letter from the plaintiffs, the city agreed to reinstate the subsidies and 
invoke a different process to review the Section 8 authorizations.
 Even if corrective action is not possible, the city officials or its attorneys, in 
consultation with representatives of the putative plaintiffs, could establish a process 
51. 438 F. Supp. 2d 203, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
52. Id. at 207–10.
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including the use of independent experts, which could lead to a resolution of the 
problem.  This demonstration of good faith might lead to a remedy which would give 
the city managers more f lexibility than an order by a court.
VI. CONCLUSION
 If the city continues to implement the above recommended alternatives, costly 
and lengthy litigation can be avoided.  If these alternatives continue to be used, we 
will be much more likely to see litigation resolved in a similar fashion to cases like 
Sheppard and Ingles, as opposed to the detention facilities cases, the McCain litigation, 
and the Callahan litigation.  The city will therefore be able save valuable time and 
resources.
